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REINVENTING THE WHEEL: HOW SECURITIZATION
CAN BOLSTER THE MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL
ENERGY EFFICIENCY LOANS
JOSEPH GONYEAU*
INTRODUCTION
Currently, one of society’s greatest goals is the reduction of green-
house gases.1 This goal is generally accepted worldwide, as evidenced by
the Paris Climate Agreement, the parties to which agreed to establish
frameworks for adopting clean energy and reducing greenhouse gases.2
After the United States’ controversial decision to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement,3 the federal government’s future in reducing greenhouse gases
remains uncertain. Despite this setback, there are existing programs aimed
at reducing greenhouse gases in the United States that the government
should ensure succeed.4 One such program is the Warehouse for Energy
Efficiency Loans (“WHEEL”).5
WHEEL operates as a multistate public-private partnership, shar-
ing resources to provide “unsecured loans to single-family homeowners
with credit-score based underwriting and public credit enhancement.”6
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1 See Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/reducing-greenhouse-gas-emis
sions_.html [https://perma.cc/4JF5-UC28].
2 See Camila Domonoske, So What Exactly Is In The Paris Climate Accord?, NPR (June 1,
2017, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/01/531048986/so-what
-exactly-is-in-the-paris-climate-accord [https://perma.cc/FZ2Y-MQBM].
3 See Valerie Volcovici, U.S. submits formal notice of withdrawal from Paris climate pact,
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017, 5:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris
/u-s-submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM
[https://perma.cc/5JWM-ZH9Q].
4 See NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE ENERGY OFFICIALS (NASEO), WHEEL: A SUSTAINABLE SOLU-
TION FOR RESIDENTIAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY 1–3, https://www.naseo.org/Data/Sites/1/docu
ments/committees/financing/documents/WHEEL_Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/G624-NGSE]
[hereinafter NASEO].
5 See id.
6 Elizabeth Bellis, WHEEL Feasibility Study: India, China, Brazil, UK, and The EU, EN-
ERGY PROGRAMS CONSORTIUM 1, 13 (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.climateworks.org/wp-content
/uploads/2017/01/EPC-WHEEL-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHJ2-QAYE].
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WHEEL’s goal is to “increase the rate of retrofitting of the nation’s single-
family housing stock” in order to bolster home efficiency and thus reduce
greenhouse gases.7 Such retrofitting includes the replacement and upgrade
of energy-efficient heating and cooling systems.8 To achieve this, WHEEL
relies on securitization, tapping into the secondary markets to bolster
investments in residential energy efficiency loans.9
Despite the benefits of WHEEL, the program has been slow to
launch.10 One major problem hindering WHEEL’s potential is the Credit
Risk Retention Rule (the “Rule”) promulgated under Section 15G of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 The Rule requires WHEEL sponsors
to maintain a 5% minimum credit risk interest in any asset they convey
to a third party.12 As a result of this requirement, private WHEEL spon-
sors will stop providing capital, due to increased risk exposure, and pub-
lic WHEEL sponsors will continually use their Program Income13 from
WHEEL to ensure that they have adequate capital to meet the risk-
retention requirement. This will hinder the growth of energy efficiency
loans because WHEEL sponsors would otherwise be able to recycle pro-
gram income back into WHEEL, ultimately growing the program.14 Loans
secured under the WHEEL program should be exempted from recent Dodd-
Frank Risk Retention requirements for three main reasons: (1) WHEEL
does not require an additional monitoring incentive; (2) WHEEL meets
the rationale for exemption under 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2); and (3) ad-
vanced institutional investors do not require additional protection.15
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR WHEEL
Promoting energy efficiency is an important societal goal.16 This
Part will introduce the impact of the residential housing sector on
7 Id.
8 Id. at 14.
9 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–2.
10 See WHEEL’s Up For Home Energy Efficiency Loans, INST. FOR MKT. TRANSFORMATION
(Jul. 6, 2015), http://www.imt.org/news/the-current/wheels-up-for-home-energy-efficiency
-loans [https://perma.cc/YP43-BN89].
11 17 C.F.R. pt. 246 (2014).
12 PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, NAUGHTY OR NICE: CREDIT RISK RETENTION IS HERE 1, 1
(Dec. 2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-instruments-and-credit/publications
/assets/Financial-markets-insights-CRR.pdf [https://perma.cc/6386-9M62].
13 See generally NASEO, supra note 4, at 1 (describing program income as “[e]xcess cash
flows from loan pools backing bonds”).
14 Id.
15 See discussion infra Sections IV.C–E.
16 See Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 1.
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greenhouse gas production. Moreover, this Part will discuss methods to
enhance residential energy efficiency, and the lack of current financing
options to make residential energy-efficient retrofits.17
A. Current Environmental Problems
Promoting energy efficiency is one of the most important goals in
society today.18 The residential sector produces a tremendous amount of
direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions.19 Direct emissions result from
the combustion of petroleum and natural gas used for cooking and heat-
ing.20 Direct emissions are also caused by sending organic waste to landfills
and wastewater treatment plants, as well as the use of fluorinated gases
in many air conditioning and refrigeration systems.21 Indirect emissions
result from power plants burning fossil fuels which produce the electricity
that powers everything in our homes.22 Together, direct and indirect emis-
sions in the residential building sector produced 981 million metric tons
(“MMT”) of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) in 2016.23 Further, as of 2015, total
residential CO2 emissions accounted for about 6% of all emissions among
the different sectors.24 Thus, the data establishes that one way to reduce
greenhouse gases in society is to focus on bolstering energy efficiency in
the residential sector.
B. Methods to Enhance Residential Energy Efficiency
Homes use most of their consumed energy for lighting, cooling,
and heating.25 Accordingly, energy-efficient retrofits can enable new and
existing buildings to utilize less energy while accomplishing the same
functions, ultimately bolstering energy efficiency and reducing greenhouse
17 See Keith Welks, Pennsylvania’s Keystone HELP, PA. TREASURY DEP’T 16 (2010), https://
www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/solutioncenter/pdfs/DOE_Webcast_Presentation_012810.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8R7-SCR2].
18 See Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 1.
19 See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa
.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions#commercial-and-residential [https://
perma.cc/Y27Q-RLE7].
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FEBRUARY 2018 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 183 (Feb. 26, 2018).
24 EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2015 ES1, ES5
-ES6, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-02/documents/2017_executive_sum
mary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H5V-9L8P] (dividing 5,411.4 by 319.6 to obtain 6%).
25 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 19.
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gas emissions.26 Homeowners have a number of options to bolster energy
efficiency in their homes.27 For example, homeowners may install “better
insulation; more energy-efficient heating, cooling, ventilation, and refrig-
eration systems; efficient fluorescent lighting; passive heating and lighting
to take advantage of sunlight; and . . . energy-efficient appliances and elec-
tronics.”28 However, upgrades can be quite expensive; for instance, asking
about the price of installing a new heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
(“HVAC”) system is similar to asking, “ ‘how much does a new car cost?’ ”29
Installing a new HVAC system can cost over $10,000.30 So, what options
do homeowners have to finance such energy-efficient upgrades?
C. Current Financing Methods
Currently, homeowners looking to make energy-efficient improve-
ments have limited financing options.31 This is especially exacerbated by
the fact that homeowners do not traditionally save money for home energy
efficiency loans.32 When it comes to making energy-efficient improvements,
most consumers are motivated by the necessity of upgrading appliances
such as heating and cooling systems.33 These reactive consumers comprise
90% of the energy efficiency market and do not make upgrades unless it is
necessary.34 Thus, without saving, most consumers are likely unable to pay
cash to make such installations, and are forced to finance their energy-
efficient upgrades.35 Possible financing sources include home equity loans,
unsecured bank loans, Property Assessed Clean Energy (“PACE”) loans,
or the use of credit cards.36
Because these retrofits can range in price from $3,000 to $15,000,
they are too small for home equity loans.37 Unsecured bank loans are not
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 Id.
29 Timothy Kautz, HVAC Installation Cost 2017—What’s a Fair Price for a New Heating
and Air Conditioning Installation?, ALL SYSTEMS MECHANICAL (Feb. 5, 2016, 4:07 PM),
https://asm-air.com/hvac/hvac-installation-cost/ [https://perma.cc/Y9M8-6223].
30 Id.
31 See Welks, supra note 17.
32 See id. at 11.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See id.
36 Carol J. Clouse, WHEEL: Aligning Energy Efficiency and Securitization, INSTITUTIONAL
INV’R (May 27, 2014), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b14zbkxx08jv0d/wheel
-aligning-energy-efficiency-and-securitization#.VYsBiBtVhBc [https://perma.cc/E3R7-PGYA].
37 Welks, supra note 17.
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a feasible option because they typically carry high interest rates.38 Further-
more, borrowers desire longer terms and lower rates than the banks will
likely give them.39 What is more, loans in the $3,000 to $15,000 range are
too large for credit cards, which carry high interest rates.40 Finally, con-
sumers may choose to pursue PACE loans, which offer secured lending
from the municipal debt market.41 Although PACE loans have potential,
they are not available in every state, and may see diminished growth in
the wake of the Federal Housing Authority’s announcement that it will no
longer insure mortgages on properties with PACE assessments.42 In order
to alleviate the lack of viable options, the federal government should work
toward bolstering other existing programs, such as WHEEL.
II. CONCEPTS UNDERPINNING WHEEL
This Part attempts to distill the basic concepts of securitization
and tranching, which are vital to understanding the WHEEL program.
Further, the analysis in this Part will delve into the potential benefits of
tranching.
A. Introduction to Securitization
Securitization has been one of the most controversial and confus-
ing financial tools in the last decade; indeed, “[i]t is generally agreed that
securitization’s abuses contributed to the global financial crisis . . . .”43
Securitization is the process of converting illiquid assets into securities.44
The process begins with the loan “originator,” often referred to as the
“sponsor.”45 First, homeowners apply for loans from commercial banks or
38 Clouse, supra note 36.
39 See Welks, supra note 17.
40 See Todd Woody, Wall Street Wants to Lend You Money to Fight Climate Change, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/04/wall
-street-wants-to-lend-you-money-to-fight-climate-change/360891/ [https://perma.cc/2FCG
-KNFK]; see also Welks, supra note 17.
41 Clouse, supra note 36.
42 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., FHA To Halt Insuring Mortgages
On Homes With PACE Assessments (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.hud.gov/press/press_re
leases_media_advisories/2017/HUDNo_17-111 [https://perma.cc/WX3V-HV4L]; see also
Clouse, supra note 36.
43 Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Post-Crisis Regulation, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
115, 117 (2016).
44 Chris Gallant, What is securitization?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 1, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07/securitization.asp [https://perma.cc/CHN9-KYML].
45 See What are Asset-Backed Securities?, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS. ASS’N (SIFMA), http://
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other financial institutions, who act as the originators.46 Typically, as is
the case with mortgage-backed securities, the loans are secured by claims
against the various properties.47 The loans created are considered assets
in the hands of the originators because they provide the originators the
right to the future income streams of the loans via interest payments and
repayment of the principal.48 The problem originators face is the risk that
the borrower will not repay the loan.49 The result is that originators are
often stuck holding a loan that might not be repaid for an extended period
of time, if at all.50 Thus, originators often sell their notes for cash, which
can in turn be used to originate more loans.51
Before selling its notes, the originator identifies the particular as-
sets that it would like to remove from its balance sheet.52 These specified
assets are then pooled into a “reference portfolio.”53 The originator then
sells the pool of assets to an issuer, which is typically a special purpose
vehicle (“SPV”).54 An SPV is an entity created, typically by a financial in-
stitution, specifically for the purpose of purchasing the pooled assets, and
realizing “their off-balance-sheet treatment for legal and accounting
purposes.”55 Put simply, the SPV enables the originator to remove the
reference pool from its books for accounting purposes.56 Thus, the origina-
tor does not retain any legal interest in the assets and the assets are im-
mune from bankruptcy proceedings involving the originator.57 The issuer
finances the purchase of the reference portfolio by using the underlying
loans from the pool to issue “tradeable, interest-bearing securities that
are sold to capital market investors.”58 On their own, these individual
loans might not be worth much to investors, but through the process of
securitization, the issuer is able to convert these loans into marketable
www.investinginbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=5&subcatid=16&id=10 [https://perma.cc
/GY9K-6CEH] (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) [hereinafter SIFMA].
46 See id.
47 See Gallant, supra note 44.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 Andreas Jobst, What is Securitization?, INT’L MONETARY FUND (IMF) 48 (Sept. 2008),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/pdf/basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z8R
-BR68].
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 See Jobst, supra note 52.
58 Id.
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securities.59 These securities are referred to as asset-backed securities
(“ABS”).60 An ABS is a general term referring to financial securities which
are secured by a pool of underlying assets, namely, the reference pool.61
Traditionally, these are assets with stable cash flows.62 Common
examples of ABS include “loans, leases, credit card debt, royalties or re-
ceivables.”63 Perhaps the most well-known, and infamous, type of ABS is
collateralized by mortgage loans.64 These are referred to as mortgage-
backed securities, but they are essentially a type of asset-backed security.65
Typically, ABS take the form of bonds or notes requiring the issuer to
repay both the principal and any interest payments by a specified date
to its creditor, the ultimate capital market purchaser.66
Next, the ABS are sold to capital market investors, such as pension
funds or hedge funds.67 To facilitate the transaction, a trustee account may
be created to pay the interest on the securities to the investors.68 Cash flows
from the loan payments in the underlying reference pool are used to fund
the trustee account.69 The funds from the account are then used to pay the
interest on the ABS to the investors.70 Investors receive either floating-
rate payments or fixed-rate payments, depending on the type of ABS.71
B. Introduction to Tranches
Before selling the ABS, the issuer may choose to divide the asset
pool into several different sections, commonly referred to as “tranches.”72
These specific types of ABS are referred to as collateralized debt obligations
(“CDOs”).73 They are referred to as CDOs because the pooled assets are
59 See SIFMA, supra note 45.
60 Jobst, supra note 52, at 49.
61 See Asset-Backed Security—ABS, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a
/asset-backedsecurity.asp [https://perma.cc/Q6RK-XNRR].
62 See Jobst, supra note 52, at 49.
63 Asset-Backed Security—ABS, supra note 61.
64 See Jobst, supra note 52, at 49.
65 Id.
66 See SIFMA, supra note 45; see also Note, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/n/note.asp [https://perma.cc/A2XD-XJ6V].
67 See Jobst, supra note 52.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 48–49.
73 See Jobst, supra note 52, at 49.
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debt obligations which ultimately act as collateral.74 Tranches are “groups
of loans with similar characteristics, such as maturity, interest rate, and
expected delinquency rate.”75 By splitting the ABS into tranches, issuers
are able to reach a broader group of investors because they can create dif-
ferent types of securities based on risk and maturity date.76 Typically, an
ABS will have three tranches: senior, mezzanine, and junior tranches.77
Each tranche is assigned a debt rating.78 Returns and losses are allocated
to investors based on their tranche, with the highest-rated tranches being
paid first.79 Senior tranches are the least risky because they provide the
first right to any income generated by the asset pool.80 Accordingly, senior
tranches are usually given the strongest credit rating of “AAA.”81 Inves-
tors in senior tranches typically receive the lowest interest rates because,
in the event the ABS declines in value, any losses are absorbed by the
lower tranches first.82 Thus, investors in the senior tranches are more
likely to receive a return on their investment.83 Mezzanine tranches are
slightly more risky than senior tranches, and typically carry credit ratings
ranging from “AA” to “BB.”84 Junior tranches are the riskiest because any
losses to the value of the security are absorbed by junior tranche owners
first.85 In exchange for accepting this risk, the junior tranches pay the
highest interest rate to investors.86
Tranching acts as a form of credit enhancement by directing los-
ses to different tranches.87 Because the junior tranches absorb losses
74 Collateralized Debt Obligation—CDO, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/c/cdo.asp [https://perma.cc/32PP-9AXA].
75 Asset-Backed Security—ABS, supra note 61.
76 See John Ogg, CDOs and the Mortgage Market, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 14, 2016, 2:00 PM),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/cdo-mortgages.asp [https://perma.cc/95NW-WNE4].
77 Jobst, supra note 52, at 49.
78 Ogg, supra note 76.
79 See Jobst, supra note 52, at 49.
80 See id.
81 Ogg, supra note 76.
82 See What Is A Senior Tranche?, WALL STREET OASIS (WSO), https://www.wallstreet
oasis.com/finance-dictionary/what-is-a-senior-tranche [https://perma.cc/L9HS-XVD6] (last
visited Jan. 11, 2019).
83 See id.
84 Ogg, supra note 76.
85 What Is A Junior Tranche?, WALL STREET OASIS (WSO), https://www.wallstreetoasis
.com/finance-dictionary/what-is-a-junior-tranche [https://perma.cc/2V67-QVJL] (last visited
Jan. 11, 2019).
86 Id.
87 FRANK. J. FABOZZI, CAPITAL MARKETS INSTITUTIONS, INSTRUMENTS, AND RISK MANAGE-
MENT 834 (5th ed. 2015).
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first, they provide credit enhancement for the mezzanine tranches; the
mezzanine tranches absorb losses after the junior tranches, ultimately pro-
viding credit enhancement for the senior tranches.88
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE WHEEL PROGRAM
This Part analyzes the origins of the WHEEL program, key partici-
pants in the program, and how the program operates. Further, this Part
will discuss the benefits of securitization, and how securitization enables
WHEEL to offer lower interest rates. The WHEEL program has success-
fully issued over 2,000 loans89 and led to tremendous environmental
benefits.90 Despite these benefits, the WHEEL program has been slow to
develop.91 This Part will also analyze some of the possible underlying
reasons behind this.
A. History
The WHEEL is an independent organization designed to provide
“low cost, large scale capital for state and local government and utility-
sponsored residential energy efficiency loan programs.”92 WHEEL traces its
origin back to 2005, when the Pennsylvania Treasury Department noticed
consumers were struggling to find affordable financing options for home
energy efficiency improvements.93 One year later, the Pennsylvania Trea-
sury Department teamed up with AFC First, a specialty energy lender, and
created the Keystone Home Energy Loan Program (“Keystone HELP”).94
The Pennsylvania Treasury invested state funds in Keystone
HELP, while AFC First administered the loans and oversaw a network
88 See id.
89 STATE & LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK (SEE ACTION), DEP’T OF ENERGY
(DOE), ENERGY EFFICIENCY FINANCING FOR LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS:
CURRENT STATE OF THE MARKET, ISSUES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 35 (Aug. 2017), https://emp
.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lmi-final0914.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X32-BD4B] [hereinafter
SEE ACTION, FINANCING].
90 See generally Bellis, supra note 6, at 7 (estimating that an issuance could save a total
of 92,562 MWh of energy).
91 Green securitisation: harnessing institutional investment to tackle climate change, STRUC-
TURED CREDIT INVESTOR (SCI) 1, 15 (2016), http://www.structuredcreditinvestor.com/pdfs
/SCI_2016_Guide_to_Renewables_ABS_Web-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ4Y-E5CU] [here-
inafter SCI].
92 NASEO, supra note 4, at 1.
93 See Welks, supra note 17, at 3.
94 See id. at 3, 5.
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of program-approved contractors.95 The goal was to make it as easy as
possible for contractors to provide low-interest loans to homeowners seek-
ing energy efficiency improvements.96 Homeowners dealt directly with
the approved contractors, who would originate the loan and provide the
energy-efficient improvements.97 AFC First would act as a lender, provid-
ing interim financing and acquiring the loans from the contractors.98 The
Pennsylvania Treasury would then purchase the loans and receive a
return on the loan payments.99 The Pennsylvania Treasury relied on state
grant opportunities to help defray the losses from non-performing loans.100
By 2010, Keystone HELP had proven to be a tremendous success
and garnered national attention.101 The Pennsylvania Treasury Depart-
ment had financed more than $30 million of energy efficiency loans and
held $20 million of the loans.102 Further, the Treasury had consistently
earned a return of close to 8% and suffered minimal loan losses of 1%.103
However, as the Treasury accumulated more of these loans, it began to
reach its diversification limits and was unable to purchase more loans
from AFC First.104 The demand for the loans was so great that the fund-
ing needed to meet the demand threatened to violate the Pennsylvania
Treasury’s portfolio diversification limits.105 Pennsylvania tried to sell its
portfolio of energy efficiency loans; however, there was no market for
these unfamiliar energy efficiency loans.106 Fannie Mae was the only pros-
pective buyer, but would only buy the loans at a serious discount.107
Pennsylvania considered securitizing its portfolio of energy efficiency
loans and selling them in the capital markets, but soon realized that the
Keystone HELP program was not large enough on its own to create an
asset class liquid enough to attract investors.108 Thus, in 2009, the
Pennsylvania Treasury Department began working with the Energy
Programs Consortium (“EPC”), the National Association of State Energy
95 See id. at 3–5.
96 See id. at 3.
97 See id. at 4–5.
98 See id. at 4.
99 See Welks, supra note 17, at 4–5, 7.
100 See id. at 4–5.
101 See id. at 8.
102 Id.
103 See id. at 7.
104 See id. at 8.
105 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 14.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See id.
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Officials (“NASEO”), and Forsyth Street Advisors to create a “national
unsecured residential energy efficiency loan product.”109
In 2010, the groups created the WHEEL program, an independent
organization focused on providing affordable capital to state and munici-
pal residential energy efficiency loan programs.110
B. Key Participants
As a public-private partnership, WHEEL involves a number of
different private institutions, foundations, and government organiza-
tions.111 The EPC is a non-profit whose goal is to coordinate energy poli-
cies and programs among different government organizations.112 EPC is
a joint venture among four groups: The National Association of State
Community Services Programs (“NASCSP”), the NASEO, the National
Association of State Regulatory Utility Commissioners (“NARUC”), and
the National Energy Assistance Directors’ Association (“NEADA”).113 EPC’s
job is to coordinate work between NASEO, the United States Department
of Energy (“DOE”), and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(“NREL”) “to provide model documents” regarding the development and
operation of “renewable finance and bond programs.”114
Other participants include Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,115 which
provides the warehousing facility;116 Renew Financial, which provides the
loans under the WHEEL program;117 and RenewFund Finance, Renew Fi-
nancial’s wholly owned subsidiary.118 RenewFund Finance originates the
loans and manages the network of contractors within each state’s WHEEL
program.119 Other participants include sponsors such as the New York
109 Id. at 13.
110 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 1.
111 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 13.
112 Id. at 1.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 1.
116 Energy efficiency 2016: Renew Financial and Citi, ENVTL. FIN. (Mar. 23, 2016), https://
www.environmental-finance.com/content/deals-of-the-year/energy-efficiency-2016-wheel
.html [https://perma.cc/8H4C-AS4N].
117 See id.
118 NY GREEN BANK, EXPANDING AVAILABILITY OF RESIDENTIAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY LOANS
TO HOMEOWNERS THROUGHOUT NEW YORK STATE 1,1 (May 2017).
119 See id. at 2.
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Green Bank (“NYGB”)120 and Keystone HELP, both of which have pro-
vided capital to the WHEEL program.121
C. How WHEEL Works
WHEEL operates as a public-private partnership between founda-
tions, states, and the private sector, sharing resources for the benefit of
society.122 WHEEL seeks to bolster the retrofitting of the single-family
housing stock in the United States and ultimately reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.123 WHEEL aims to achieve this goal by “creat[ing] a secondary
market for residential clean energy loans . . . .”124 So, how does the
WHEEL program tap into the secondary markets?
First, the sponsors of energy efficiency loan programs in partici-
pating states transfer their public funds, either American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) funds or other public funds, to a custodial ac-
count at Renew Financial.125 Next, financial institutions such as Citigroup
provide the initial funding to the WHEEL warehouse.126 Renew Financial
acts as the servicer and originator of the loans and manages the network
of approved contractors in each sponsor’s jurisdiction.127 When a home-
owner desires to make an energy-efficient upgrade to their home, they
reach out to one of the approved contractors managed by Renew Finan-
cial.128 Utilizing both the original warehouse financing that Citigroup
used to fund the WHEEL (the private funds), and the sponsors’ funds from
various programs (the public funds), Renew Financial originates the un-
secured energy efficiency loans in each sponsor’s jurisdiction.129 The loans
are then placed into the WHEEL warehouse, which is managed by Citi-
group.130 While in WHEEL, the portfolio of loan receivables is securitized
120 Id. at 1.
121 NASEO, supra note 4, at 3.
122 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 13.
123 Id.
124 NASEO, supra note 4, at 1.
125 Id. at 2.
126 See NY GREEN BANK, supra note 118, at 1–2.
127 Id. at 2.
128 See id.
129 See Cisco Devries, Warehouse for Energy Efficiency Loans, Address at US DOE Better
Buildings Summit 51 (May 27, 2015), https://betterbuildingssolutioncenter.energy.gov/sites
/default/files/Wednesday%20-%20Accessing%20Secondary%20Markets%20to%20Stimu
late%20Financing%20for%20Energy%20Efficiency%20Investments%20%281%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UF8-DQQW] (citing to slide titled “WHEEL Financing: How it Works”).
130 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–2; see also U.S. Homeowners to Benefit from Ground-
breaking Home Energy Loan Financing Platform, RENEW FIN. (June 15, 2015), https://
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by aggregating the loans into diversified pools until they are large enough
to support the issuance of a rated ABS.131
The proceeds from the sale of the securities to capital markets in-
vestors are first used to reimburse Citigroup, who provided the ware-
house line of credit that was used to help purchase the loan receivables.132
Any additional proceeds from the sale of the securities are used to recapi-
talize the WHEEL in order to support Renew Financial’s purchase of future
loan receivables into WHEEL.133 Eventually, WHEEL will be entirely
funded by the sale of ABS.134 Revenues from the ABS loan pool will be
used to pay off the capital market investors.135 Once these investors are
paid off, any additional revenues from the loan pool will be redistributed
to the sponsors as Program Income.136 The amount of Program Income
paid to each sponsor is dependent on its contribution relative to the size
and overall performance of the entire loan pool.137 Program Income may
be recycled back into WHEEL to support the purchase of future energy
efficiency loan receivables in the sponsor’s jurisdiction, so as to grow the
program further, or reallocated for different uses.138
D. Benefits of Securitizing Energy Efficiency Loans
Securitization is an extremely useful tool; indeed, despite its role in
the 2008–2009 financial crisis, securitization in the United States has
rebounded because no tool has been created that delivers the same
benefits.139 Specifically, securitizing energy efficiency loans attracts in-
vestors, which ultimately decreases the cost of capital and reduces in-
terest rates for borrowers of these energy efficiency loans.140 Securitization
does this by creating the necessary liquidity to attract more investors to
this asset class; enabling investors to invest based on their risk profiles;
and creating historical performance data, which is necessary for accurate
risk assessment.141
renewfinancial.com/resources/us-homeowners-benefit-groundbreaking-home-energy-loan
-financing-platform [https://perma.cc/7VPN-XJP2].
131 See Clouse, supra note 36; see also NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–2.
132 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 2.
133 See id. at 1.
134 See NY GREEN BANK, supra note 118, at 2.
135 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–2.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2.
138 Id.
139 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 11.
140 See id.
141 See id.
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First, securitization creates the liquidity necessary to attract more
investors to energy efficiency loans.142 Liquidity refers to how easily “an
asset or security can be quickly bought or sold in the market without
affecting the asset’s price.”143 Investors prefer highly liquid assets be-
cause the more liquid an asset is, the more quickly and easily it can be
turned into cash, enabling investors to seamlessly enter and exit new
investment positions.144 Traditionally, individual loans such as mort-
gages are illiquid assets that investors are uninterested in due to the risk
of default associated with owning an individual loan.145 Accordingly,
banks are stuck holding these individual loans on their books, which
prevents them from originating more loans.146 Securitization enables a
financial institution to convert multiple loans into a liquid asset that
attracts investors, thus creating a market for these loans.147 This enables
banks to sell the loans to issuers such as Citigroup, providing them with
the capital they need to originate more loans.148
Second, securitization is able to further attract investors because
it allows them to “diversify their risk by taking a small piece of many
loans rather than a large piece of a smaller number of loans.”149 When
the loans are divided into tranches, investors are able to choose which
tranche of the loans they invest in based on their risk preferences.150
Risk-averse investors can choose to invest in senior tranches, albeit for
a lower yield.151 Conversely, investors who are inclined to take on more
risk may invest in mezzanine and subordinate tranches.152 Such tranches
are subject to greater risk since they absorb the first losses associated
with the default of underlying borrowers, but investors are compensated
142 See id.
143 Liquidity, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity.asp [https://
perma.cc/AQ8U-QW93].
144 See Miranda Marquit, Investing Basics: Why Liquidity Matters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Dec. 3, 2012, 8:36 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mu
tual-fund-investor/2012/12/03/investing-basics-why-liquidity-matters [https://perma.cc
/8N6K-U3EE].
145 See How does securitization increase liquidity?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investope
dia.com/ask/answers/042115/how-does-securitization-increase-liquidity.asp [https://perma
.cc/EJH8-HBJZ].
146 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 11.
147 See How does securitization increase liquidity?, supra note 145.
148 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 11; see also NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–2.
149 Bellis, supra note 6, at 11.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See id.
2019] REINVENTING THE WHEEL 653
for this risk through greater yields.153 By providing investors investment
options that align with their risk preferences, securitizing energy effi-
ciency loans will attract more potential investors.154 Furthermore, each
successful securitization will provide valuable performance data on the
success of the underlying loans.155 As the market becomes more familiar
with the default rates on energy efficiency loans, investors will be able
to more accurately and efficiently price the risks involved with this new
asset class, decreasing the required rate of return.156
WHEEL is predominately able to offer lower interest rates and
attract investors by using subordinate capital as a form of credit enhance-
ment.157 Most energy efficiency loans offer below-market rates to encour-
age more energy-efficient retrofits.158 The problem that arises is that these
lower rates may not attract secondary market investors, who are seeking
competitive, market-rate returns.159 In order to compensate investors,
participating energy efficiency programs need to offer credit enhance-
ment.160 Participating energy efficiency programs do this by contributing
subordinated capital to the WHEEL.161 This subordinate capital attracts
investors because it will be used to absorb the first losses in the loan
pool,162 ultimately providing credit enhancement by shielding private
capital from riskier tranches.163 Assuming that a loss is not incurred on
the subordinated capital, program sponsors will then earn a return on
their investment in the form of Program Income.164
Accordingly, securitization attracts investors to energy efficiency
loans by bolstering liquidity; offering investors the benefit of diversifica-
tion; providing performance data, which is vital for risk assessment; and
mitigating risk through subordinated capital.165 By attracting more
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See NY GREEN BANK, supra note 118, at 1.
156 See id.
157 STATE & LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK (SEE ACTION), ACCESSING
SECONDARY MARKETS AS A CAPITAL SOURCE FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY FINANCE PROGRAMS:
PROGRAM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS AND ADMINISTRATORS 21 (Feb.
2015), https://www4.eere.energy.gov/seeaction/system/files/documents/secondary_markets
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSP5-7TWR] [hereinafter SEE ACTION, ACCESSING].
158 Id. at 25.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 Id. at 21.
162 See id.
163 See SEE ACTION, ACCESSING, supra note 157, at 34.
164 See id. at 35 (referring to tbl.5); see also NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–2.
165 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 11; see also NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–2.
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investors, WHEEL is able to issue more ABS for sale to capital markets
investors.166 The proceeds from the sales will be used to recapitalize the
WHEEL, ultimately increasing the supply of capital that Renew Finan-
cial can use to originate more energy efficiency loans.167 Ultimately,
through securitization and credit enhancement, interest rates on loans
will decrease, and it will cost less for borrowers to make energy-efficient
upgrades on their homes.168 Reduced borrowing costs will encourage home-
owners to make more energy-efficient upgrades, which will decrease the
demand for energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.169
E. WHEEL in Action
WHEEL offers personal loans for residential energy-efficient
upgrades.170 One of the major benefits of the WHEEL program is that
states and municipal governments looking to bolster residential energy
efficiency loans in their jurisdictions do not need to create their own
program.171 Instead, they simply supply capital to WHEEL, and Renew
Financial manages a network of approved contractors in the sponsor’s
jurisdiction.172 Specifically, WHEEL offers loans ranging from $1,000 to
$20,000, for terms of three, five, seven, or ten years.173 Loans are provided
based on homeowners’ FICO scores, with the minimum permissible FICO
score set at 640.174 The loans may be used for everything from HVAC
replacement to retrofits with “combined solar, water and energy efficient
improvements.”175 The application process for loans is designed to be as
simple as possible.176 For instance, applications may be done over the
phone or online, with approval as quickly as in a few hours.177
Energy-efficient improvements create substantial economic and
environmental benefits: for every $1 million invested into WHEEL, an
166 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–2.
167 See id.
168 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 11.
169 See id.
170 See Devries, supra note 129, at 51 (citing to the slide titled “Wheel Financing: How it
Works”).
171 See id. at 46 (citing to the slide titled “WHEEL Overview”).
172 See id. at 48 (citing to the slide titled “WHEEL Principles: Uniform Underwriting,
Qualified Contractors & Qualified Projects”).
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 Id.
176 SEE ACTION, FINANCING, supra note 89, at 35.
177 Id.
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estimated 625 projects valued at $8,000 each will be started.178 Further,
it is projected that for every $1 million invested into WHEEL, 100 jobs
will be created.179 Moreover, every $1 million invested into WHEEL will
also lead to substantial environmental benefits.180 It is projected that such
an investment will save 750 megawatt hours (“MWh”) of electricity, 40,000
therms of natural gas, 10,000,000 gallons of water, and 700 metric tons
of CO2 annually.181
Thus far, the WHEEL program has issued over 2,000 unsecured
loans totaling over $19 million among New York, Pennsylvania, Kentucky,
Ohio, and Florida.182 WHEEL completed the world’s first securitization
of energy efficiency loans in 2016,183 consisting of 2,079 loans from
Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Cincinnati, Ohio.184 The loans involved in
the securitization were issued between June 2006 and September 2015.185
The loans involved ranged in size from $1,452 to $15,000, and were used
on projects including: ventilation system installation, boiler replacement,
central air replacement, furnace replacement, insulation installation, new
thermostat installation, water heater replacement, and window improve-
ment.186 Together, Citigroup and Renew Financial issued $12.58 million
in the form of ABS “backed by pools of residential energy efficiency
loans.”187 Calvert Investment Management purchased the single A-rated
tranche.188 The tranche was “backed by loans with a maximum maturity
of 10 years.”189 Renew Financial estimates that the securitization saved
a total of 92,561 MWh of energy, thus avoiding a total of 57,318 tons of
178 See Devries, supra note 129, at 52.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 SEE ACTION, FINANCING, supra note 89.
183 ENVTL. FIN., supra note 116.
184 Elizabeth Bellis, Energy Efficiency Loans for Low and Moderate Income Households:
The Warehouse for Energy Efficiency Loans (WHEEL) as a Case Study, ENERGY PROGRAMS
CONSORTIUM (EPC) 1, 6–7 (Sept. 2016), http://docketpublic.energy.ca.gov/PublicDocu
ments/16-OIR-02/TN213848_20160929T154149_Colin_Bishopp_Comments_Innovative
_Financing_Pilot.pdf [https://perma.cc/J52M-773M].
185 Id. at 7.
186 Id.
187 Citi and Renew Financial Announce First Ever Energy Efficiency Loan Asset-Backed
Security Transaction, BUSINESSWIRE (June 15, 2015, 12:30 PM), https://www.business
wire.com/news/home/20150615006147/en/Citi-Renew-Financial-Announce-Energy-Ef
ficiency-Loan [https://perma.cc/AZ2W-AGP2].
188 IFR: Citi sells first Green ABS bond of consumer loans, RENEW FINANCIAL (June 18,
2015), https://renewfinancial.com/resources/ifr-citi-sells-first-green-abs-bond-consumer
-loans [https://perma.cc/7GYG-RJQU].
189 Id.
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greenhouse gases.190 Current WHEEL Members include the New York
Green Bank,191 Pennsylvania’s Keystone Home Energy Loan Program, the
Greater Cincinnati Energy Alliance, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the
Commonwealth of Virginia, and Florida.192
WHEEL has yet to complete any additional securitizations; in 2015,
however, the New York Green Bank pledged $20 million in subordinate
capital to WHEEL.193 The subordinated capital, along with the warehouse
financing provided by Citi, will be used to purchase New York State resi-
dential energy efficiency loan receivables.194 The New York Green Bank
hopes that the program will support residential energy efficiency improve-
ments while simultaneously bolstering a young asset class in residential
energy efficiency receivables.195 The funds were used to offer loans of up
to $20,000, with durations of up to ten years.196 Under New York’s pro-
gram, the funds will be used to pay contractors to install “Energy Star
appliances; qualified indoor and outdoor lighting fixtures and light bulbs;
qualified heating, ventilation and air conditioning improvements; certain
water conservation measures; qualified windows, skylights and doors;
certain air sealing and insulation measures; [and] energy monitoring and
metering systems.”197
The New York Green Bank forecasts that the energy efficiency im-
provements will lead to huge energy savings.198 For instance, it projects a
low lifetime savings of 396,000 MWh in electricity, and a potential maxi-
mum savings of 421,000 MWh in electricity.199 Further, its lifetime low esti-
mate of fuel savings is 5,540,000 MMBtu, with a high estimate of 6,020,000
MMBtu.200 Ultimately, the New York Green Bank estimates a massive
reduction in greenhouse gases from these energy efficiency improve-
ments.201 Its low estimate on greenhouse gas reductions is 570,000 metric
190 Bellis, supra note 6, at 7.
191 See NY GREEN BANK, supra note 118, at 1.
192 Renew Financial Acquires AFC First, Leading Energy Efficiency Lender, PR NEWSWIRE
(Oct. 7, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/renew-financial-ac
quires-afc-first-leading-energy-efficiency-lender-300155402.html [https://perma.cc/7RS4
-PUE3].
193 See NY GREEN BANK, supra note 118, at 1.
194 Id.
195 See id.
196 Id. at 2.
197 Id. at 2–3.
198 See id. at 3.
199 See NY GREEN BANK, supra note 118, at 3.
200 Id.
201 See id.
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tons, with a high estimate of 605,000 metric tons.202 Given WHEEL’s ob-
vious benefits for the environment, homeowners, and capital markets
investors, what has held WHEEL back?
F. Why Has WHEEL Been Slow?
One of the reasons that the WHEEL program has been slow to
develop is market uncertainty over the riskiness of the underlying energy
efficiency loans.203 Unsecured residential energy efficiency loans are a
relatively young asset class, and there is not much data available on the
performance of these loans.204 Despite the first successful securitization
in 2015, “[i]t can take three to seven years of loan history for rating agen-
cies to fully evaluate the credit of a portfolio.”205 Once enough perfor-
mance data is gathered, ratings agencies will be able to more accurately
reflect the risk of unsecured energy efficiency loans.206 More accurate
prices will ultimately instill investor confidence in WHEEL, leading to an
increase in investment.
Another likely reason that the WHEEL program has been slow to
develop is the involvement of public sponsors.207 WHEEL is partially
funded by public agency sponsors, and such sponsors are subject to po-
litical processes and government approval.208 Obtaining approval to pro-
vide public funds to WHEEL can be a very time-consuming process.209
Moreover, this process is likely slowed even further by the current un-
certainty over the success of these underlying loans.210 Furthermore,
WHEEL securitizations have also likely been hindered by the fact that
WHEEL loans must be aggregated until they meet the size requirements
of the capital markets.211 Market uncertainty, paired with the tedious
202 Id.
203 See SCI, supra note 91, at 15.
204 Charlotte Kim et al., Innovations and Opportunities in Energy Efficiency Finance,
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 1, 21 (May 2014), https://www.wsgr.com/publica
tions/PDFSearch/WSGR-EE-Finance-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU24-V57V].
205 Id.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 20.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 See SCI, supra note 91, at 15.
211 Sean Kidney, Deep-dive into recent green ABS: Toyota funds EVs & hybrids/WHEEL
from Citi & Renew Financial for hoe energy efficiency loans/solar ABS from Sunrun, CLI-
MATE BONDS INITIATIVE (Jul. 12, 2015), https://www.climatebonds.net/2015/07/deep-dive
-recent-green-abs-toyota-funds-evs-hybrids-wheel-abs-citi-renewfinancial-home [https://
perma.cc/A9AR-2EGT].
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process of seeking governmental approval, has likely made it much more
difficult to reach the aggregate amount of loans necessary to spark interest
in the capital markets. Although uncertainty over the riskiness of the
energy efficiency loans, the involvement of public sponsors, and the re-
quirement to aggregate enough loans to attract institutional investors
have likely held WHEEL back, they are not WHEEL’s greatest problem.212
IV. THE DODD-FRANK RISK RETENTION RULE SHOULD NOT APPLY
TO SECURITIZED ENERGY EFFICIENCY LOANS UNDER THE
WHEEL PROGRAM
This Part analyzes the application of the Dodd-Frank Credit Risk
Retention Rule (“the Rule”) to the WHEEL program. Sponsors such as
Renew Financial and other suppliers of private capital will be forced to
retain a 5% interest in each tranche of all issued ABS interests.213 This
will ultimately expose the sponsors to more risk than originally allotted
under the program.214 Exposing companies such as Renew Financial to
extra risk will deter private capital from joining WHEEL, unless interest
rates on these loans are increased to compensate the sponsors for this
risk.215 Increasing interest rates would deter homeowners from taking
loans out via WHEEL, and failure to raise rates would scare away pri-
vate capital, without which there would not be enough funds in WHEEL
to purchase loans for aggregation.216 Either way, the Rule acts as a road-
block, and will ultimately kill the WHEEL program. Securitized energy
efficiency loans under the WHEEL program should be exempt from the
Rule because 1) WHEEL loans do not need an extra monitoring incen-
tive, 2) the rationale for exempting community-focused loans also applies
to WHEEL loans, and 3) institutional investors are sophisticated and do
not require additional protection.217
212 See SCI, supra note 91; see also Kim et al., supra note 204, at 20; Kidney, supra note 211.
213 See Guide to the Credit Risk Retention Rules for Securitizations, MORGAN LEWIS 1, 7
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/handouts/final_risk_retention
_guide_handout.ashx [https://perma.cc/T88X-LWC4].
214 See SEE ACTION, ACCESSING, supra note 157, at 21, 33–34.
215 See id. at 5 (WHEEL provides credit enhancement via public funds in order to compen-
sate private funds for risk; however, the Rule effectively eliminates the credit enhancement,
exposing the private capital to more risk).
216 See discussion infra Section IV.B.
217 See discussion infra Sections IV.C–E.
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A. Creation of the Risk-Retention Rule
Section 941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act directed The Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal Finance Housing Agency, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (“Federal Banking Agencies”) and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to promulgate a rule
which requires securitizers of ABS to maintain a 5% minimum credit risk
interest in any asset they convey to a third party.218 Accordingly, the SEC
and Federal Banking Agencies implemented a joint final rule, The Dodd-
Frank Credit Risk Retention Rule, in October 2014.219
The Rule for ABS became effective on December 24, 2016, and re-
quires sponsors to retain a 5% minimum credit risk in their securitiza-
tions.220 The rule aims to align the interests of sponsors and investors.221
It does so by incentivizing issuers to monitor loans through their retained
credit risk, which encourages investors to issue better quality loans.222
B. Application to WHEEL
Although it may not be clear at the outset, WHEEL members will
be affected by the Rule. The Rule defines “asset-backed security” as a
“fixed-income or other security collateralized by any type of self-liquidating
financial asset (including a loan, a lease, a mortgage, or a secured or un-
secured receivable) that allows the holder of the security to receive
payments . . . from the asset . . . .”223 The loans in WHEEL are unsecured
residential energy efficiency loans which are originated in the sponsors’
programs and clearly qualify as ABS under 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(77).224 A
bit more nebulous, however, is the question of who qualifies as a sponsor
under the Rule.225 Under Section 15G of the Exchange Act, risk retention
218 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 941(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i))
(amending the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to include Section 15G).
219 SEC ET AL., Credit Risk Retention Final Rule (Oct. 2014), https://www.sec.gov/rules
/final/2014/34-73407.pdf [https://perma.cc/63GN-V99Y].
220 PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, supra note 12.
221 Id.
222 Cassandra Jones Havard, Too Conflicted to Be Transparent: Giving Affordable Financing
Its ‘Good Name’ Back, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 451, 489 (2017).
223 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(79).
224 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 1–3.
225 Charles A. Sweet, Credit Risk Retention: Who Is The Sponsor of a Securitization?,
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requirements are imposed on any ABS “securitizer,” including the spon-
sor.226 The Rule defines a sponsor as “a person who organizes and initiates
an asset-backed securities transaction by selling or transferring assets,
either directly or indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuer.”227
In commentary included with the adoption of the rules, the agencies clari-
fied factors to consider in identifying a sponsor.228 Specifically, these factors
include whether the sponsor is transferring the receivables to the issuing
entity, taking an active role in the selection of assets to be securitized, and
actually selecting the assets on its own initiative, as opposed to acting “at
the direction of a third party or acting solely as a ‘rubber stamp.’ ”229
Based on this language, financial institutions such as Renew Fi-
nancial qualify as sponsors under the Rule; Renew takes an active role
in originating the loans to be included in the securitization, manages the
contractor network of participating programs, and also services the loans.230
Moreover, government sponsored programs, such as Keystone HELP, will
likely qualify as sponsors under the rule as well. These programs provide
funds to WHEEL which are used to purchase loans arising in their juris-
diction.231 Although they do not appear to have an active role in the
selection of assets, they may be considered sponsors because participat-
ing programs have the “flexibility to design their programs to reflect local
priorities.”232 This provides Renew with guidelines on how to originate
loans.233 Accordingly, under WHEEL, government programs such as Key-
stone HELP likely qualify as sponsors.
Qualifying Renew Financial and participating government programs
as sponsors under the Rule will devastate the WHEEL program. As it re-
lates to Renew Financial, Renew would have a number of options to comply
with risk retention; however, regardless of the method, the Rule will dis-
courage private capital from entering the program.234 Without the private
capital, WHEEL cannot provide low-cost energy efficiency loans and is
MORGAN LEWIS 1, 5 (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/credit-risk-re
tention-who-is-the-sponsor-of-a-securitization [https://perma.cc/M66Q-GKAM].
226 Id.
227 SEC ET AL., Credit Risk Retention Final Rule (Oct. 2014) at 159–60.
228 See Sweet, supra note 225, at 32–33; see also SEC ET AL., Credit Risk Retention Final
Rule (Oct. 2014).
229 Sweet, supra note 225; see also SEC ET AL., Credit Risk Retention Final Rule (Oct.
2014) at 32–34.
230 See NY GREEN BANK, supra note 118, at 2.
231 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 2.
232 Id.
233 See id. at 1–2.
234 See Sweet, supra note 225, at 7.
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ultimately killed.235 First, Renew could satisfy the requirement through
vertical or horizontal retention.236 Vertical retention would require Renew
to retain a security representing at least 5% of each tranche.237 Horizon-
tal interest would require Renew to maintain an “ ‘eligible horizontal
residual interest’ in the issuing entity in an amount equal to at least 5%
of the fair value of all ABS interests issued as part of a securitization
transaction.”238 Regardless of the method, the result is that Renew is ex-
posed to more risk in the junior tranches. This will deter private capital
and other companies like Renew from entering the WHEEL program; the
dominant reason these companies offered their funds is the subordinated
capital provided by government-sponsored programs.239 The public funds
are subordinated and thus operate as a form of credit enhancement.240
The “[s]ubordinated capital is placed in a first loss position to protect more
senior investors.”241 Usually, investors in subordinated capital require
higher returns in order to compensate them for this risk; however, in the
context of energy efficiency loans, the government-sponsored programs
demand lower returns so as to bolster the yields to more senior investors.242
The result of the Rule is that suppliers of private capital are now exposed
to more risk, without bolstering their returns. With the Rule, the only way
to attract investors would be to increase interest rates on these energy
efficiency loans; however, doing so would drive loan consumers away from
the WHEEL program. In essence, this defeats the purpose of providing
public funds in the first place. Public funds are designed to attract private
capital by mitigating risk because they will absorb the first losses to the
loan pool.243 This helps shield private capital from riskier tranches of the
pool.244 The Rule circumvents WHEEL’s design, exposing private capital to
more risk without offering a greater return. Thus, the Rule will deter pri-
vate investors and ultimately kill the program, if it has not done so already.
Further, if participating government programs are considered
sponsors, they will also be deterred from entering the program. The Rule
prohibits the sale of the risk-retention interest held by sponsors.245
235 See SEE ACTION, ACCESSING, supra note 157, at 10.
236 See Sweet, supra note 225, at 7.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 See SEE ACTION, ACCESSING, supra note 157, at 21, 33–34.
240 Id. at 34.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See Bellis, supra note 6, at 15–16.
244 See id.
245 PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, supra note 12.
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Accordingly, public sponsors in the WHEEL will increasingly need capital
in order to fund the risk-retention interest over time.246 One of the major
benefits of WHEEL is that sponsors such as Keystone HELP receive Pro-
gram Income from the remaining cash flows of the loan pool.247 Sponsors
are given quite a bit of flexibility and may either use this income to sup-
port future energy efficiency loans in their jurisdiction or reallocate it for
other purposes.248 However, if sponsors are not exempt from the Rule,
they will be forced to continually use a portion of their income to meet
the credit risk requirement, instead of growing their loan programs. This
will obviously hinder the growth of energy efficiency loans in each spon-
sor’s jurisdiction, which will in turn limit the ultimate reduction of carbon
emissions. Ultimately, the effects of the Rule will be devastating to the
WHEEL program, deterring vital private capital, and possibly discourag-
ing government programs from joining WHEEL in the first place.
C. WHEEL Does Not Require an Additional Monitoring Incentive
The Dodd-Frank Risk Retention Rule should not apply to securi-
tized energy efficiency loans for a number of reasons. First, the rationale
for the Rule is to encourage issuers to monitor loans with the ultimate
goal of preventing risky loans;249 however, the WHEEL program does not
need an extra monitoring incentive. As the energy efficiency loans are
unsecured, WHEEL only offers these loans to individuals with a minimum
FICO score of 640.250 Also, as of 2014, energy efficiency loans had signifi-
cantly outperformed other types of unsecured consumer loans, “with
annual overall delinquency and losses of about 1 percent.”251 Peter Krasja,
CEO of AFC First, asserts that the reason for such low delinquency rates
is because these loans are taken by “thinking consumers,” borrowers who
are looking to make long-term improvements to their homes.252 Further,
he asserts that energy efficiency loans are “closed-end installment loans,”
which typically have much lower delinquency rates than revolving lines
of credit, such as credit cards.253 Krasja also asserts that the WHEEL
246 See id.
247 NASEO, supra note 4, at 2.
248 Id.
249 See Jones Havard, supra note 222, at 489.
250 See Jeffrey Schub, Nevada Greenbank Study Deliverable 5, COAL. FOR GREEN CAPITAL
1, 31 (May 2016), http://coalitionforgreencapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Nevada
-Green-Bank-Study-Potential-Products.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4XD-J69K].
251 See Clouse, supra note 36.
252 Id.
253 See id.
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program is able to eliminate buyer’s remorse, because the work is only
performed by a network of approved contractors who are not paid until “the
customer is 100% satisfied.”254 Finally, as consumers’ energy-efficient
retrofits begin to cut back on energy expenses, the consumers will have
more cash available to help repay the loans.255
D. WHEEL Meets the Requirements for Exemption
In response to concerns raised by a number of parties, the SEC and
Federal Banking Agencies provided an exemption from risk-retention rules
under Section 15G(e) for community-focused loans.256 Although WHEEL
loans are different from community-focused loans, the rationale for the ex-
emption clearly applies to WHEEL as well. The agencies may provide such
an exemption under 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2) when the exemption would:
(A) help ensure high quality underwriting standards for
the securitizers and originators of assets that are securitized
or available for securitization; and (B) encourage appropri-
ate risk management practices by the securitizers and
originators of assets, improve the access of consumers and
businesses to credit on reasonable terms, or otherwise be
in the public interest and for the protection of investors.257
Accordingly, the SEC and Federal Banking Agencies exempted
these loans because they were “originated by government-administered
programs . . . .”258 Further, the Federal Banking Agencies strongly con-
sidered the mission behind such community loans, which were to bolster
at-risk communities or help build wealth for lower-income families.259
The Agencies reasoned that 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2)(A) was satisfied
because the entities were incentivized to uphold strong underwriting
standards; their mission of providing affordable loans to low income
borrowers was “integral to the lending programs administered by these
lenders . . . .”260 Finally, the Federal Banking Agencies agreed to the
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 See SEC ET AL., Credit Risk Retention Final Rule (Oct. 2014) at 383.
257 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2).
258 SEC ET AL., Credit Risk Retention Final Rule (Oct. 2014) at 383.
259 See id.
260 See id.
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exemption because providing affordable loans to low-income communities
was in the public interest, satisfying § 78o-11(e)(2)(B).261
Although the WHEEL program is a public-private partnership, it
is clearly a government-administered program, as the Energy Programs
Consortium (“EPC”) helped establish WHEEL.262 The EPC’s stated purpose
is to “foster coordination and cooperation among government agencies in
the areas of energy policy and program development.”263 WHEEL further
satisfies the first element of the requirements for an exemption264 because
WHEEL’s mission is integral to its lending program. WHEEL’s purpose is
to “provide low cost, large scale capital for state and local government and
utility-sponsored residential energy efficiency loan programs” in order to
bolster investment in energy-efficient retrofits and cut back on greenhouse
gases.265 Similar to community-focused exempted loans, the WHEEL pro-
gram is focused on providing affordable energy efficiency loans266 and is
thus incentivized to uphold strong underwriting standards. Finally,
WHEEL easily satisfies the second element for an exemption267 because
encouraging investment in energy-efficient retrofits is clearly in the public
interest, due to the huge potential economic and environmental benefits.268
E. Sophisticated Institutional Investors Do Not Require Additional
Protection
Lastly, although the 5% risk retention requirement seeks to
protect investor interests,269 these sophisticated institutional investors
do not need additional protection. Institutional investors include hedge
funds, mutual funds, pension funds, endowment funds, and insurance
companies.270 Institutional investors are investment professionals who
261 See id. at 384.
262 See NASEO, supra note 4, at 1.
263 Bellis, supra note 6, at 1.
264 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2)(A).
265 NASEO, supra note 4, at 1.
266 See id. (offering 10% interest rates for energy improvement projects at five-, seven-, and
ten-year terms).
267 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2)(B).
268 See Devries, supra note 129, at 52 (For every $1 million invested into WHEEL, an
estimated 625 projects valued at $8,000 each will be started and will save an estimated
750 MWHs of electricity, 40,000 therms of natural gas, 10,000,000 gallons of water, and
700 metric tons of CO2 annually).
269 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2)(B).
270 Institutional Investor, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/institu
tionalinvestor.asp [https://perma.cc/2DSE-SCBJ].
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pool capital and use that capital to invest on behalf of other people.271
Traditionally, such investors have faced fewer protective regulations be-
cause they are assumed to be more knowledgeable, and thus more able
to protect themselves.272 Institutional investors are considered more knowl-
edgeable due to their resources and the “specialized knowledge” required
to extensively research a number of possible investment options.273 Indeed,
institutional investors are “the pro athletes of the investing game.”274
Institutional investors are not to be confused with retail investors,
who are individual non-professional investors making small investments
for their personal accounts.275 Retail investors do require additional
protection; however, because ABS “are complex and issued in large de-
nominations, most buyers are institutional investors.”276 Retail investors
are only exposed to such complex securities through mutual funds, which
are run by institutional investors investing on behalf of individuals.277
Institutional investors are responsible for about 70% of stock trading
volume in the United States and controlled 25.3 trillion of all U.S. finan-
cial assets by the end of 2009.278 Accordingly, the Rule does not need to
protect these professional investors. Such investors have “deep resources
at their disposal,” and “engage in sophisticated research and analysis of
companies and markets.”279 Thus, institutional investors should be pre-
pared to assess the risk of the investment they are entering, and choose
a tranche that corresponds to their risk tolerance.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the WHEEL program has the potential to create sig-
nificant economic and environmental benefits.280 Not only will it bolster
271 Institutional Investors: Get Smart About the “Smart Money” (2015), FIN. INDUS. REGU-
LATORY AUTH. (FINRA), https://www.finra.org/investors/institutional-investors-get-smart
-about-smart-money [https://perma.cc/73DM-UQSM] (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) [herein-
after FINRA].
272 See Institutional Investor, supra note 270.
273 Id.
274 FINRA, supra note 271.
275 See Retail Investor, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/retailinvestor
.asp [https://perma.cc/KE83-8PAJ].
276 Investing in Mortgage-Backed Securities, T. ROWE PRICE, https://individual.troweprice
.com/staticFiles/Retail/Shared/PDFs/Insights/InvestingInMortgageBackedSecurities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8CD-4TDA].
277 See id.
278 FINRA, supra note 271.
279 Id.
280 See Devries, supra note 129 (For every $1 million invested into WHEEL, an estimated
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jobs for contractors who make these energy-efficient improvements, but
such improvements will also lead to significant reductions in the use of
electricity, water, and fuel.281 Currently, the WHEEL program has been
hampered by uncertainty over the riskiness of the underlying assets,282
the struggle to originate loans caused by slow political processes which
prevent sponsors from quickly joining WHEEL,283 and the Dodd-Frank
Credit Risk Retention Rule. The Rule will ultimately expose sponsors,
such as Renew Financial and government programs, to more risk than
originally allotted for under the program.284 Exposing companies such as
Renew Financial to extra risk will deter private capital from joining
WHEEL, unless interest rates on these loans are increased to compen-
sate the companies for this risk.285 Increasing interest rates would deter
homeowners from taking loans out via WHEEL, and failure to raise rates
would scare away private capital, without which there would not be
enough funds in WHEEL to purchase loans for aggregation.286 To prevent
the destruction of such a beneficial program, sponsors in the WHEEL
program should be exempted from the Rule. The exemption should apply
because WHEEL loans are fixed-rate and suffer from fewer delinquencies
than revolving lines of credit;287 they are part of a government-adminis-
tered program, and are incentivized to uphold strong underwriting stan-
dards because their mission of providing affordable energy efficiency loans
is integral to the lending program;288 and the institutional investors the
Rule aims to protect are the professionals of the investing world and do
not need additional protection.289
625 projects valued at $8,000 each will be started and will save an estimated 750 MWHs
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